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A Theory of Focal Points in 2x2 Games

Abstract

Since the classic work of Schelling, the notion of a focal point has been widely applied to explain
coordinated behavior. However, focal points remain largely outside the formal apparatus of game
theory. This paper develops a model of play in 2x2 games where payoff differences determine
what strategy players will perceive as “salient” and choose to play. The model uniquely predicts
which outcome will emerge for virtually the entire class of 2x2 normal form games. For the
subset of such games involving coordination and asymmetric payoffs, payoff differences identify
focal outcomes and strategies in the same way shared social knowledge produces coordination in
Schelling’s symmetric games. The model characterizes situations when Nash equilibria are likely
to be played, even in a one-shot interaction, and predicts which equilibrium will obtain in games
containing more than one. It identifies other circumstances in which a non-equilibrium outcome
will predominate. Finally, the theory specifies when a player is likely to select a strategy based
solely on consideration of her own payoffs, and when and why the same player will be prompted
to act strategically. Experimental results are presented that test the predictions of the model.
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“The concepts of ‘focal point’ and ‘salience’ have become part of the tool-kit of game
theory…Despite that, focal points have never been integrated into the formal structure of the
theory. Although theorists often invoke notions of salience when dealing with otherwise
intractable problems of equilibrium selection, they do so in a spirit of faute de mieux.”
(Gold and Sugden (2006, p. 24)
1.

Introduction
The dilemma of how two people can coordinate on the same strategy despite the presence

of multiple equilibria is among the oldest and most fundamental in game theory. Firms, nations,
and individuals frequently face situations where coordination is among the most desirable
outcomes, and sometimes such coordination is achieved. However, traditional game theory offers
little guidance on how to systematically predict when coordination will occur.
Two different streams of literature have addressed this problem. One stream, originating
with Schelling (1960), examines behavior in pure matching games in which players receive a
fixed positive payoff whenever their strategy selections match and a payoff of zero otherwise. 2
A simple example of such a game is one where players each choose between strategies labeled
Heads and Tails, receive $1 if their choices match (i.e., are HH or TT), and receive $0 otherwise.
A large body of experimental evidence demonstrates that people do much better than chance at
coordinating in these types of games. Specifically, it appears that the strategy Heads comes
immediately to mind more often than Tails, resulting in the focal point outcome Heads-Heads.
Schelling (1960) attributed this better-than-chance performance to one of the strategy options

2

Subsequent experimental work on behavior in pure coordination games has been conducted by Mehta, Starmer
and Sugden (1994). There has also been a significant amount of theoretical work attributing “focality” to a notion of
group rationality and team reasoning, rather than to shared cognition or culture. See, for example, Sugden (1995),
Bacharach & Bernasconi (1997), Gold & Sudgen (2006), and Colman et al. (2014).
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appearing more salient in the minds of the players because of commonly shared culture or
psychology.3 The shared salience of one of the strategy labels results in that outcome being
perceived as a focal point. Traditional game theory cannot explain the coordination observed in
symmetric matching games since the theory gives no special status to a label of Heads versus
Tails.
Although salient labels may be powerful coordination devices in games with symmetric
payoffs, they lose much of their potency in games with payoff asymmetries. For instance,
Crawford et al. (2008) conducted experiments involving games with salient labels but
asymmetric payoffs for coordination. They conclude that, “when payoffs are symmetric across
players, salient labels yield high coordination rates, but that when payoffs are even minutely
asymmetric and the salience of labels conflicts with the salience of payoff differences, salient
labels may lose much of their effectiveness and coordination rates may be very low.”4 This
observation that payoff salience dominates label salience in asymmetric games provides a
foundation for our approach to the study payoff-based focal points in asymmetric games.
A second stream of literature, initiated by theorists John Harsanyi and Reinhardt Selten
(1988), examines coordination in asymmetric games. Harsanyi and Selten (1988) proposed two
deductive criteria, payoff dominance and risk dominance, that agents might employ to decide
which equilibrium to aim for in coordination problems with payoff asymmetries. Beginning with
papers by Cooper et al. (1990) and Van Huyck et al. (1990), experimentalists set out to
determine which of the criteria better described actual behavior.

The results of these and

subsequent studies have not been encouraging. Neither selection criteria proves consistently
3

For a much more recent discussion, see Sugden (2011).
Similarly, Agranov et al (2012) report results from experiments in which an “Announcer” informing players
regarding the differences in cooperative payoffs in ‘Battle of the Sexes’ type games can make focal outcomes “reemerge” by describing the payoffs in vague or ambiguous terms that mask differences in what players receive.
4
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successful at explaining behavior observed in games involving multiple equilibria. Subsequent
experiments (e.g., Haruvy and Stahl (2004) and Leland (2012)) suggest that a correspondence
between the predictions of either selection criteria and observed behavior is coincidental.
Although deductive approaches to equilibrium selection such as payoff-dominance and riskdominance systematically fail to predict behavior in games, they have been integrated into the
formal structure of game theory. Somewhat paradoxically, the intuitive approach to equilibrium
selection pioneered by Schelling, based on salience and focal points, has been successful in
explaining coordinated behavior, but remains outside the formal apparatus of game theory. 5
In this paper we attempt to partially address this dilemma. As noted earlier, focal points are
commonly conceived of as arising from perceptions or knowledge shared by players in a game.
In the context of symmetric games, the perception might be that a red colored square attracts
more of players’ attention relative to three other squares colored white, or that the label “Heads”
is perceived as salient relative to “Tails.” When we move to the world of asymmetric games,
perhaps the most obvious shared characteristic of the game is that it is being played by players
who care about their payoffs. As such, at least part of what makes strategies in asymmetric
games appear focal to players, and at least part of what produces game outcomes that are focal,
must have to do with the structure of the payoffs players face.
In both our definition and in Schelling’s definition, a focal point is a strategy profile that is
salient for both players and a Nash equilibrium. That is, a focal point is mutually salient and a
mutual best-response. In Schelling’s case of symmetric games, mutual salience of strategy labels
is determined by shared culture or shared knowledge. In our setting of asymmetric games,
mutual salience is determined by a shared intuition of how payoff differences are perceived.

5

In this regard Colman (2006) notes, the “… focal point concept is almost universally acknowledged by game
theorists as an important device for equilibrium selection, but it has not been assimilated into formal game theory”.
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With this in mind, we examine a model of play in 2x2 games in which focality of outcomes and
strategies is determined by the payoff structure of the game. We consider games played by
players who focus on larger differences in payoffs across strategies, paralleling work by Bordalo
et al. (2012) in choices under risk in which agents focus on larger differences in payoffs across
lotteries. Our proposed model assumes that in a 2x2 game, players attend to salient payoff
differences across strategies. A player’s ‘salient strategy’ is defined as that player’s strategy
yielding the larger payoff associated with the larger difference in payoffs. A player perceives his
payoffs to be more salient than those of the other player if his largest payoff difference across
strategies is at least as large as the other player’s largest payoff difference. Otherwise, he
perceives the other player’s strategy to be more salient. If a player’s own payoffs are most
salient, he myopically focuses on those payoffs and chooses his salient strategy. Otherwise, he
focuses on the other player’s salient payoffs which prompts him to think about what the other
player will do. This motivates him to best respond to his belief about what the other player will
do. Under these assumptions, the model predicts systematic Nash equilibrium play, equilibrium
selection, and out-of-equilibrium play, and it enables players to be systematically strategic in
some situations and myopic in others.
In this paper, we develop and apply the model of salience-based choice noted in the preceding
paragraph to formalize the notion of a focal point in games where focality is determined by the
payoff structure of the game, and to predict behavior in 2x2 games. The model applies to games
with a unique equilibrium and to games with multiple equilibria. We derive formal testable
propositions from the model which we investigate in an experiment that we conducted involving
choices in 2x2 games. We then apply both the aggregate and subject-level data to distinguish our
model from prominent alternative explanations for coordination in 2x2 games.
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More specifically, we build on Crawford et al.’s (2008) observation that the structure of payoff
differences can account for observed instances of coordination and coordination failures. 6 To
motivate this idea, consider the following coordination game in which Player 1's task is to decide
whether to play strategy U(p) or strategy D(own) against a Player 2 referred to as "Other" who
chooses between strategy L(eft) and strategy R(ight).
If Other chooses L and you choose U

You receive

11.00

and other receives 10.00

D

You receive

4.10

and other receives 3.00

If Other chooses R and you choose U

You receive

4.00

and other receives 3.10

D

You receive

4.10

and other receives 3.10

The payoff matrix for this game is shown on the left in Figure 1 and denoted I. From Player
1’s perspective, what grabs attention in this game is the payoff of 11 associated with the larger
payoff difference to Player 1 (11.00 - 4.10) versus (4.10 – 4.00). The salience of the payoff of 11
confers salience on strategy U (indicated by italics). That is, U is Player 1’s salient strategy. The
salient payoff to Player 2 conditional on Player 1 choosing U or D will be the outcome 10.00 the better outcome associated with the larger payoff difference (10.00-3.10) versus (3.10-3.00).
The salience of the payoff of 10 confers salience on strategy L. That is, L is Player 2’s salient
strategy. The outcome of the game, (11,10) (in bold) is the one where the choices of saliencebased strategies U and L coincide. This salience coincident outcome is also the payoff dominant
Nash equilibrium. This is a situation where the game outcome is a focal point, in that it is the
salience coincident outcome (it is arrived at through each player choosing her salient strategy),

6

It is important to emphasize that we are not implying that payoff differences are the only determinants of
focality in asymmetric games, but we hope to convince readers that they are an important source of focality that can
be integrated into the formal apparatus of game theory.
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and it is a best response for both players (neither has an incentive to revise her strategy, holding
the other player’s strategy fixed).
Figure 1
To consider how this outcome mirrors the outcome in a symmetric payoff setting, imagine a
2x2 game where each player chooses between strategies labeled "Star Spangled Banner" (SSB)
and "Oh Canada" (OC), are each paid a dollar if their choices match and are paid nothing
otherwise. For two players who are patriotic Americans, it seems plausible that SSB is perceived
as the salient strategy in which case the outcome is salience coincident and a Nash equilibrium.
In game II in Figure 1, the payoff that stands out to Player 1 is again 11, recommending the
choice of strategy U. However, in this game, for Player 2 the larger payoff (10) associated with
the larger payoff difference (10-3.10) confers salience on strategy R. Here the choice of
strategies associated with salient payoffs results in the non-equilibrium outcome UR. In this
game, the salience coincident outcome is not a focal point since Player 2 will wish to revise her
choice.
The analogous outcome in the (SSB,OC) game described above might occur if one player is
American and the other is Canadian and neither knows the nationality of the other. Here the
outcome resulting from players choosing the strategy they perceive as salient, (SSB, OC), is
salience coincident but not focal since both receive a payoff of zero.
In the games described above agents play myopically in the sense that each is struck by the
salience of one of his or her own payoffs and chooses the strategy corresponding to that payoff
without reflecting on what the other player might choose. But now consider game III depicted on
the right in Figure 1. Here, once again, the payoff that is salient to Player 1 is the 11 he receives
by choosing U when Player 2 chooses L. For Player 2, the difference in her payoffs conditional
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on Player 1 choosing U (7-6) is smaller than if Player 1 chooses D (6-3) so the comparison of
own-payoff differences favors D. Nevertheless, intuitively, the payoff in the game that will grab
Player 2’s attention may instead be Player 1’s salient payoff of 11 since Player 1’s largest payoff
difference is greater than Player 2’s largest payoff difference. To the extent that Player 1’s
payoffs are more salient to Player 2 in this game than Player 2’s own payoffs, Player 2 will
realize the strategic aspect of the interaction, anticipate Player 1’s choice of U, and best respond
to that choice by choosing L, producing the Nash equilibrium UL. This is a second instance
where the outcome produced by the trait players share – sensitivity to large differences in payoff
– is a focal point.
An (SSB,OC) game analog to game III might be one where the Canadian Player 2 knows
Player 1 is American making SSB salient for both, resulting in the salience coincident outcome
SSB which is, once again, focal.
Finally, consider the game in the lower center of Figure 1. Here, payoff differences conditional
on the other player choosing one or the other of his or her strategies are equal for each player so
sensitivity to larger payoff differences provides no guidance as to what either player should
choose. In such cases, we assume strategy choices are random. The symmetric payoff game
analog here might be one in which both players are French and neither song is salient or of
special significance.
It is interesting to note that the strategy choices that follow from agents choosing as described
above will, in many cases, be identical to the choices Level-1 players would make in a cognitive
hierarchy model (e.g., as in Camerer et al. 2004). Level-1 players choose the strategy that
maximizes their expected utility assuming the opponent is a Level-0 player choosing strategies
randomly. In games I, II and IV this results in the same strategy choices and outcomes as
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salience-based choice. 7 Predictions of the two models diverge only in games where one player
perceives one of the opponent’s payoffs as salient. In game III, for example, a Level-1 row
player will behave like a player choosing based on salience. The Level-1 column player, on the
other hand, will choose R as 0.5U(6)+0.5U(6) > 0.5U(7)+ 0.5U(3). This results in the game
outcome UR for Level-1 players rather than the outcome UL predicted for salience-based
players.
In Section 2, we propose a formal model of this type of salience-based play in
asymmetric 2x2 games. For this purpose, we extend the intuition from models of binary risky
choice involving cross-lottery comparisons (e.g., Tversky (1969), Gonzalez-Vallejo (2002)) that
emphasize the roles of regret, gist, similarity and salience perception associated with attribute
differences across alternatives (e.g., Loomes and Sugden (1982), Reyna and Brainerd (1991),
Rubinstein (1988), Leland (1994, 1998) and Bordalo et al (2012)) to model and predict behavior
in games. Our approach is also consistent with models of binary intertemporal choice based on
similarity and focusing (Leland (2002), Rubinstein (2003), Scholten & Read (2010), Koszegi &
Szeidl (2013)).
Specifically, we assume that players choose strategies associated with their own salient
payoff if that payoff appears more salient to them than their opponent’s salient payoff, and best
respond to their opponent’s salient strategy if the opponent’s salient payoff appears more salient.
We then demonstrate the following properties of 2x2 games with salience-based players:
1) For games where each player has a salient strategy, there is exactly one salience
coincident (SC) outcome (as in games I, II and III.)

7

As pointed out by one of the reviewers of this paper, it is sometimes assumed that Level-0 players instead play the
focal strategy to the game if one exists. However, as noted in the introductory quote, the precise definition of focal
strategies in asymmetric payoff games is ill-defined so we focus here on the random response assumption.
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2) For games containing a Nash equilibrium, if the Nash equilibrium is the SC outcome,
then that will be the outcome of the game (as in games I and III).
3) For games containing multiple pure-strategy Nash equilibria, when one’s salient payoff is
more salient than the other’s salient payoff and these salience perceptions are shared by
both players, the outcome will be a Nash equilibrium (there will be no coordination
failure as in game III).
4) For games containing multiple pure-strategy equilibria, when each player perceives her
own payoff to be at least as salient as her opponent’s, the outcome will always be the SC
outcome (as in game I and II), and will be an equilibrium if and only if that equilibrium is
SC (as in game I).
We refer to the resulting theory as the payoff salience model (PSM). Under the PSM, properties
1 – 4, make strong predictions about which equilibrium will be selected and when out-ofequilibrium play and coordination failures will occur. The framework also provides a natural
definition of a focal point for games where focality is determined by endogenously defined
salient payoffs.
While the restriction to 2x2 games may seem limiting, we note that our approach is
related to models of risky and intertemporal choice that posit comparisons of attributes across
alternatives and, as such, focus on binary choices 8. Interestingly, just as comparative models of
risky and intertemporal choice explain choice anomalies, we will show that our comparative,
salience-based model of strategy choice explains important puzzles in game theory, such as how
and when players achieve coordination, by predicting equilibrium selection and out-ofequilibrium play. The PSM also makes predictions about when players will systematically play
8

Di Guida et al (2013) presents an analysis of results from an experimental study exploring aspects of focality with
a larger number of strategies.
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myopically (by focusing on their own payoffs) and when they will play strategically (by focusing
on their opponent’s payoffs). This contrasts with classical game theory (where players are always
strategic) and it contrasts with cognitive hierarchy models (where players have a fixed level of
strategic sophistication).
Individual 2x2 games also serve as the building blocks for larger games and they are the
games with classic stories that are used in game theory lore (e.g., battle of the sexes, stag hunt,
chicken) and so have a natural interpretation about the types of strategic interactions they
represent. Moreover, as Shubik (2012) notes, many decisions involve binary choice and much of
human interaction is dyadic. The 2x2 game may thus serve as a natural starting point for
considering how the salience of strategies and the focality of game outcomes will inform our
understanding of equilibrium selection and coordination failure more generally.

2.

A Model of Focal Points with Endogenous Salient Payoffs
In this section we summarize the main theoretical results of our model that we will test

experimentally in Section 3. A formal presentation of the definitions and proofs pertaining to our
model is provided in the Appendix.
The basic idea of the model we propose is that players focus on their own payoffs in a
game when their own payoffs are most salient and they focus on their opponent’s payoffs when
those payoffs are most salient, where the salience of payoffs is endogenously predicted by the
model. The differential focus on one’s own versus another’s payoffs is important because it leads
naturally to the idea that (i) when a player’s own payoffs are most salient, he chooses myopically
(e.g., by selecting his strategy containing is largest salient payoffs), and that (ii) when the other
player’s payoffs are most salient, the player chooses strategically (by considering what the other
player will do and selecting a best response). In other words, the salience of payoffs might
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moderate the degree of strategic thinking in which a player engages. Thus, the strategic
sophistication of a player is also endogenous in our model. In contrast, standard approaches do
not allow for endogenous changes in the strategic behavior of players. In classical game theory,
players are always strategic, and in models of Level-k thinking, each player has a fixed level of
strategic sophistication. Finally, the notion that behavior is myopic when one’s own payoffs are
salient and is more strategic when other’s payoffs are salient is consistent with recent research on
salience effects for decisions under risk and over time. For risk, Bordalo et al. (2012) argue that
behavior is risk-averse when a lottery’s downside is salient and is more risk-seeking when a
lottery’s upside is salient. In an experiment for choices over time, Fisher and Rangel (2014) find
that behavior is relatively impatient when the delay to receiving a reward is salient and is more
patient when the magnitude of the reward is salient. Our approach thus naturally relates to this
prior work on salience in individual choice and suggests that, at least qualitatively, shifts in
behavior due to changes in salience perception provides a unifying behavioral principle across
the domains of risk, time, and strategic interactions.
In presenting the intuition behind the model, consider any 2x2 game of the form in Table
1 in which

denotes the payoff to Player 1 when he plays strategy

and Player 2 plays

. To capture the behavior of Player 1, if influenced by salient payoffs, consider strategy
(defined more precisely in the appendix):
Strategy

:

(i) Choose Player 1’s salient strategy if his own payoffs are at least as salient as his opponent’s.
(ii) Best respond to Player 2’s strategy if her payoffs are more salient than Player 1’s payoffs.
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In (i), Player 1’s salient strategy is defined as the strategy containing Player 1’s largest salient
payoff, which is defined in more detail in the appendix. Strategy

dictates that when Player 1’s

own salient strategy is at least as salient to him as Player 2’s salient strategy, he chooses his own
salient strategy. However, if Player 2’s salient strategy is more salient to Player 1 than Player 1’s
own salient strategy, Player 1 is prompted to think strategically, in which case he best responds
to Player 2.
As we state more precisely in the appendix, there may be a parameter,

, which

reflects the decision maker’s sensitivity to his own versus other’s payoff salience. In our analysis
of our experimental data, we implicitly set

1. Of the fourteen games we analyze, this

specification predicts unique strategies for each player for thirteen of the games. The remaining
game has equal payoff differences for both strategies for both players and so does not have a
unique salient strategy for either player.
A nice property of the parameter
increasingly myopic as

is that, under strategy

goes to zero and becomes increasingly strategic as

accounting for the parameter

a player becomes
grows large. Thus,

may make the model econometrically testable when applied to

predict empirical frequencies with which strategies are played. In this sense,

may be thought of

as a continuous analog to levels of strategic sophistication in a cognitive hierarchy model of
boundedly rational behavior.
To the extent both players employ Strategy

with the corresponding notation and

definitions applied analogously for Player 2, there will always be a salience coincident outcome
defined by the salient strategies selected by the two players. If neither player has any incentive to
deviate from the strategy profile that produced this outcome (i.e., to the extent the outcome is a
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mutual best response), this outcome is a focal point. However, if the salience coincident outcome
is not a mutual best response, salience based reasoning leads to a coordination failure.
Definition (Salience Coincident Outcome): A strategy profile
is salient for Player 1 and

,

is salience coincident if

is salient for Player 2.

Based on the above definition, we formally define a focal point for payoff-salient games
(that is for games where each player has a salient payoff):
Definition (Focal Point): A focal point is a strategy profile that is both salience coincident and
a mutual best-response.
In essence, a focal point is a strategy profile that is salient for both players and a Nash
equilibrium. In other words, a focal point is mutually salient and a mutual best-response. This
notion for payoff-based focal points is qualitatively similar to Schelling’s notion of label-based
focal points which also consists of a strategy profile that is salient for both players and a Nash
equilibrium. The main difference is that in Schelling’s case, what is salient for both players is
driven by salient strategy labels based on a shared culture, whereas in our case, it is driven by
salient strategies based on a shared perception of payoff differences.
One implication of our definition is that there may be strategy profiles that are salience
coincident but not focal in that they result in failure to coordinate on an equilibrium. Another
implication is that focal points are endogenous to the model since both salience coincident
outcomes and Nash equilibria are endogenous. Applying the preceding definitions, we offer the
following results:
Proposition 1: Every 2x2 payoff-salient game has a unique salience coincident outcome.
Proposition 1 implies that a focal point is unique in any 2x2 payoff salient game,
whenever one exists. However, while payoff-salient games always have a salience coincident
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outcome as in games I and II in Figure 1, this outcome is not necessarily an equilibrium as
reflected in Game II, and thus existence of focal points is not guaranteed. We next provide our
main result in this section:
Proposition 2 (Nash equilibrium with salience-based players): For any 2x2 game, if a Nash
equilibrium is a focal point, then the outcome for salience-based players will be that equilibrium.
Proposition 2 applies to all 2x2 games where each player has a unique salient strategy,
including coordination games (such as the stag hunt and battle-of-the-sexes) where there are
multiple Nash equilibria, as well as non-coordination games (such as dominance solvable games)
where there is a unique equilibrium.
Proposition 2 demonstrates that in certain cases, the usual strong rationality assumptions
about players’ behavior can be weakened to assumptions which require much less strategic
sophistication, while still ensuring that a Nash equilibrium will obtain. In particular, since at least
one player chooses his salient strategy in the proof of Proposition 2, the usual assumption that
both players best-respond and arrive at a Nash equilibrium is a conclusion in Proposition 2 rather
than an assumption. Moreover, Proposition 2 predicts which equilibrium will obtain when there
are multiple equilibria and it predicts when equilibrium behavior will emerge even in one-shot
games.
2.1

Coordination in 2x2 games
Proposition 2 established sufficient conditions under which a Nash equilibrium will be

played for the entire class of 2x2 games with salience-based players. We can establish a stronger
result if we restrict attention to payoff-salient games with multiple pure-strategy equilibria
(which include the entire class of 2x2 coordination games such as the stag-hunt as well as the
class of anti-coordination games such as battle of the sexes and the game of chicken).
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Proposition 3 (Coordination for salience-based players): Consider any 2x2 payoff-salient
game with multiple pure strategy equilibria. If one player’s payoffs are perceived as more salient
than the other’s and both players follow strategy

, both players will always select a unique

equilibrium (i.e., there will be no coordination failure).
The result in Proposition 3 is somewhat surprising since it implies that for a large and
important class of 2x2 games, salience-based players will always coordinate on a unique Nash
equilibrium. Proposition 3 tells us that any 2x2 payoff-salient game with multiple equilibria will
result in an equilibrium even if players are less sophisticated than perfectly rational agents. As
before, since one player plays his salient strategy in each case in the proof of Proposition 3, the
usual assumption that both players always best respond and arrive at an equilibrium is a
conclusion in Proposition 3, rather than an assumption. Salience perceptions guide players to an
equilibrium. Proposition 3 also predicts which equilibrium will obtain. Moreover, the result in
Proposition 3 does not rely on any of the conditions commonly identified as promoting
coordination (e.g., repeat play, (one-way) communication between players, salient strategy
labels). Instead, it obtains because the players share a common perceptual apparatus. In contrast
to rational agents who share common knowledge of their rationality, our model involves
salience-based players who share a common sensitivity to the magnitude of payoff differences.
Our final result considers the case where each player focuses only on her own payoffs:
Proposition 4: Consider any 2x2 payoff-salient game where each player perceives his own
payoffs to be more salient than his opponent’s payoffs. Then:
(i)

The outcome for salience-based players is salience coincident

(ii)

Salience-based players select an equilibrium if and only if that equilibrium is a focal
point.
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Testing the model on experimental data
We have presented a model of boundedly rational behavior that applies to both

coordination (multiple-equilibria) games and non-coordination (single-equilibrium games) in
which salience coincident outcomes and focal points arise endogenously through the payoff
structure of the game. We refer to this model as the payoff-salience model (PSM). An
implication of the PSM is that there will be certain game payoff structures for which strategy
choice will be sensitive to the cardinal values of the payoffs players face and others where only
the ordinal ranking matters. We refer to the former as payoff-variant games and the latter as
payoff-invariant games. To illustrate, consider battle-of-the-sexes game BOS 1 and matching
game M 1 in Figure 2 each involving three possible outcomes we can think of as (H(igh),
M(edium) and L(ow) to Player 1 and h(igh), m(edium) and l(ow) to Player 2. In BOS 1with
salience-based players, for M =2 and m=2 as shown, P1 will choose U and P2 will choose L
resulting in the outcome UL. If we now increase M to 9, P1 will choose D resulting in the
outcome DL. BOS 1 is an example of a game with a payoff-variant game structure. In contrast,
in game M 1, players’ strategy choices will be D and R, the outcome of the game will be DR,
and this result will not change for variations in the values of M and/or m. It is an example of a
payoff-invariant game.
To test these predictions, in (citation withheld) we presented subjects with twenty two
games, twenty of which were 2x2s each involving the three possible outcomes H, M, and L to
Player 1 and h, m, and l to player 2.9 Fourteen of these were 2x2 coordination games, each with
two pure strategy equilibria (6 battle of the sexes games, 5 matching games, and 3 stag-hunt
games), three were cycle games with no Nash equilibria, and three games were solvable by

9

Two other games, examined how players choose when their opponent has more than two strategies available.
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iterative dominance. Some games were predicted to be payoff-variant whereas others were
predicted to be payoff-invariant. 10 These predictions were tested by varying the values of the
M(edium) and/or m(edium) payoffs.
Seventy-eight students at the University of Trento in Italy participated in one of four
sessions with approximately 20 subjects per session. Half of the subjects were assigned the role
of Player 1 and the other half the role of Player 2. Participants sat at computer terminals
separated by partitions. At the beginning of the experiment, students were asked to read the
instructions shown below (written in Italian in the experiment) while the laboratory administrator
read them aloud:

For each of the following screens you are randomly paired with another participant in the experiment
referred to as “Other.” For each screen, you are presented with a choice between two options U or D.
Simultaneously, Other is presented with a choice between two options L and R. You and Other will
receive payoffs depending on the decision you make and the decision Other makes. Information about
what you and Other will receive depending on the choices you both make will be provided in a table like
the one shown below. For this table, if Other chooses his or her option L and you choose your option U,
you receive 5 and Other receives 2. If instead you choose your option D, you receive 5 Euros and Other
received 4 Euros. If Other chooses his or her option R and you choose your option U, you receive 7 Euros
and Other receives 7 Euros. If you instead choose your option D, you receive 1 Euro and Other receives 2
Euros.

If other choose L and you choose U
10

You receive

5.00

and other receives 2.00

In (citation withheld due to double blind review) we derive these predictions from a version of the PSM in
which players only best respond when their own payoff differences are equal and, therefore, uninformative. In the
present paper, we make the more plausible assumption that a player best responds when the other player’s payoff
differences are more salient than his own, and we extend the PSM to provide an axiomatic approach to focal points,
equilibrium selection, and out-of-equilibrium play. Our formal results (Propositions 1, 2, 3, and 4) all originate in
this paper and emerge as a consequence of our novel definitions of a salience coincident outcome and a focal point.
These propositions make novel predictions regarding the behavior of salience-based players which we test
experimentally in this section.
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5.00

and other receives 4.00

You receive

7.00

and other receives 7.00

D You receive

1.00

and other receives 2.00

If other choose R and you choose U
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For each question please indicate the option you would rather have. At the end of the experiment, one of
these situations will be selected at random and you and the person with whom you are matched will be paid
according to the decisions you both made. As such, in addition to the 5 Euro participation fee you can earn
an additional amount between 0 and 13 Euros. Please do not talk with the other participants for the
duration of the experiment. If you do not understand something, raise your hand and one of the
experimenters will come to your aid.

Subjects then proceeded with the experiment at their own pace. Subjects registered their choices
by clicking their mouse on the desired strategy and were then asked to confirm their choice.
The order in which the games were presented to subjects was randomized and payoffs
corresponding to the U or D and L or R label in each game alternated at random.
Here we test the predictions of the PSM regarding equilibrium selection and out of
equilibrium play using the subset of games from (citation withheld) involving coordination. We
considered three types of incentive structures in our experimental games involving multiple
equilibria – Pareto-ranked equilibria in which one equilibrium is preferred to but riskier than the
other (Stag-Hunt games); conflicting interest games where each player prefers a different
equilibrium (Battle-of-the-sexes games); and games with identical equilibria that can be arrived
at if players match each other’s strategy choices (matching games).
3.1

Predicting Equilibrium Selection in 2x2 Games
Proposition 2 provides a sufficient condition under which a Nash equilibrium will be

played by salience-based players for any 2x2 game. Consider again the Battle of the Sexes game
BOS 1 in the upper left in Figure 2. Player 1 will select strategy U to the extent that $10 is his
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salient payoff. He will also choose U as a best-response, if he instead perceives Player 2's payoff
of $9 as salient. Consistent with these possibilities, 90% of subjects in the role of Player 1 chose
U. Player 2 will choose L if she perceives $9 as salient or if she perceives Player 1's payoff of
$10 as salient. In the experiment, 97% of subjects in the role of Player 2 do so. The resulting
outcome of the game ($10, $9) is both salience coincident (indicated in bold font) and a Nash
equilibrium (indicated by an * ). The same logic applies in the remaining four games in Figure 2.
A significant majority of Player 1s (79%, 92%, 85%, and 85%) and Player 2s (67%, 95%, 72%,
and 85%) either chose the strategy corresponding to their own salient payoff (if that strategy is
perceived to be most salient) or played their best response (if the other player's strategy is
perceived to be more salient). As predicted by Proposition 2, the game outcomes that result from
these choices are, in every game, salience coincident and a Nash equilibrium.
Figure 2
The overall response patterns subjects exhibit make clear that the occurrence of the
salience coincident outcome in these games is the result of players consistently choosing the
strategy corresponding to their salient payoff. If Player 1s and 2s choose their own-payoff
salient or best response strategies across all five games in Figure 2, the choice patterns observed
for games (BOS 1, M 1, M 2, M 3, SH 1) should be (U, D, D, D, U) for Player 1s and (L, R, R,
R, L) for Player 2. These are, in fact, the majority (59%) and modal (44%) patterns observed,
respectively. Moreover, nearly 80% of all patterns observed are no more than one response
away from the predicted ones, and no other pattern occurs more that 13% of the time (and those
involve only 1 deviation from the predicted patterns).
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Although each game contains two pure-strategy equilibria, the PSM uniquely predicts
which equilibrium is selected. Choices in games like BOS 1 and SH 1 could be focal for
additional reasons. Di Guida and Devetag (2013), for example, propose that an “obvious or
intuitive” solution to such games would be to select “the strategy supporting an outcome that is
attractive for both players.” However, this heuristic would not provide guidance in the remaining
games. The observation that the number of subjects choosing strategies consistent with either
salience or obtaining the best joint outcome is larger for BOS 1 and SH 1 than the other games in
Figure 2 (in BOS 1 and SH 1 at least 90% of subjects choose strategies consistent with the focal
outcome) may suggest that both heuristics come into play when applicable. Our claim is only
that focality based on payoff differences is important, not that it is the only source of focality.
It is worth noting that equilibrium selection might be expected to be particularly
challenging in games such as M 1, M 2, and M 3, since both pure strategy equilibria offer the
same payoffs to each player. In these games, it is somewhat remarkable that minor variations in
payoffs out of equilibrium can serve as a coordination device such that one of the two equilibria
with identical payoffs will be selected by most subjects. A similar observation that a nonequilibrium outcome may act as a coordination device was proposed in Bosch-Domenech and
Vriend (2008).
3.2

Predicting out-of-equilibrium play
Proposition 4 applies to 2x2 salient games with multiple (pure strategy) Nash equilibria.

For the case when each player’s own salient payoffs are more salient to him than the payoffs of
his opponent, two key observations in Proposition 4 are (i) a Nash equilibrium will be played if it
is salience coincident and (ii) a Nash equilibrium will be played only if it is salience coincident.
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The sufficient condition (i) is implied by Proposition 2 and data supporting this prediction is
presented in Figure 2. Figure 3 provides behavioral evidence regarding the necessary condition
(ii) in Proposition 4 – that in a 2x2 salient coordination or anti-coordination game, where each
player perceives his own payoffs as more salient than the payoffs of his opponent, the outcome
will only be a Nash equilibrium ( * ) if that equilibrium is salience coincident.
The salience coincident outcome (in bold) is not an equilibrium in any of the four
games11 depicted in Figure 3. In each case, the majority of Player 1s (64%, 90%, 64%, and 95%)
and a majority of Player 2s (79%, 90%, 59% and 97%) choose the strategy associated with their
own-salient payoff. As a result, in every game the predicted outcome is the outcome which is
salience coincident, as predicted by Proposition 4.
Figure 3
Consistent with the prediction that equilibria do not obtain in the games in Figure 3
because players are choosing strategies corresponding to their largest salient payoffs, the modal
choice patterns exhibited by Player 1s (U, D, U, U occurring 33%) and Player 2s (R, L, R, R,
occurring 44%) are those implied by the PSM and 80% of all the response patterns observed are
no more than one response away from the predicted patterns. Note that focality determined by
an outcome being attractive to both players would not produce the majority result in any of these
games.
3.3

11

Salience-Based Play or Level-1 Behavior?

These games are asymmetric analogs to symmetric games where players disagree on which strategy label is
salient.
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The experimental results presented to this point are consistent with the hypothesis that
players base their choices on salient payoffs. However, as suggested in the Introduction, they are
also consistent with the hypothesis that respondents are Level-1 players in a Level k (Stahl and
Wilson 1994; 1995) or Cognitive hierarchy model (Camerer et al. 2004). Given the philosophical
differences between these models and the PSM, it is somewhat surprising that their predictions
considerably overlap. Level-k models attempt to explain behavior deviating from standard game
theoretic predictions by modeling the agent as possessing limited and fixed strategic
sophistication. A salience-based player, in contrast, is myopic in some situations and strategic in
others. In the absence of there being something particularly distinctive about a counterpart's
payoffs, the salience-based player focuses exclusively on what is in it for him.
The endogenous variation in strategic sophistication in the PSM provides a way of
distinguishing between the two models. In the PSM, when each player perceives his own
payoffs as more salient than those of his opponent, the predictions of the models correspond to
those that would follow if players are Level-1 boundedly rational. However, when an opponent’s
payoffs are more distinct, the salience-based player focuses on his opponent’s payoffs, which
prompts her to think strategically and conform to Nash equilibrium play. It is in these
circumstances that the predictions of Level-1 bounded rationality and the PSM diverge.
Figure 4
To attempt to discriminate between explanations of play in 2x2 games, consider the
games in Figure 4. In Matching game M 5 and the Stag Hunt SH 2, Player 1 has no salient
payoffs and the expected value of strategies U and D are equal assuming Player 2 is Level-0. In
the Battle of the Sexes games BOS 5 and BOS 6, Player 2 has no salient payoffs and expected

A Theory of Focal Points

25

values for strategies L and R are equal in both games assuming Player 1 is a Level-0 opponent.
Thus, for games M 5 and SH 2, Player 1 would play randomly if Player 1 is Level 1, and in
games BOS 5 and BOS 6, Player 2 would play randomly if Player 2 is Level 1. In contrast, for
games M 5 and SH 2, the PSM predicts Player 1 to best respond to Player 2’s salient strategy and
play D in both games. For games BOS 5 and BOS 6, the PSM predicts Player 2 to best respond
to Player 1’s salient strategy and play L in BOS 5 and R in BOS 6. In every case, a majority of
players lacking own-salient payoffs chose the strategy that best responds to their opponent’s
salient strategy as predicted by the PSM.
At the level of individual response patterns, the predicted Player 1 response pattern for
games M 5 and SH 2, pattern, DD, occurs 31% of the time. The pattern DU occurs 28% of the
time and 31% of subjects exhibit UD. In contrast, UU, the response pattern opposite the
predicted one occurs only 10% of the time. These observations suggest that the responses were
not entirely random, given the systematic prevalence of DD over UU, consistent with PSM.
However, the prevalence of DU and UD response patterns indicates that there could be some
degree of random choice in these games, consistent with Level 1.
Player 2 response patterns more clearly favor the PSM over Level-1. The predicted
choice pattern for Player 2s in BOS 5 and BOS 6, is LR. This pattern occurs 44% of the time.
Patterns LL and RR, departing from the predicted pattern by one choice, occur 33% and 15% of
the time, respectively. The pattern RL, opposite that predicted by the PSM, occurs only 8% of
the time. In game SH 3, both players lack salient payoffs, and the behavior of both players
appears random, as predicted by both the PSM and Level 1.
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Analysis of the response patterns players exhibit across the thirteen games for which the
PSM predicts systematic strategy choices provides additional support for the PSM over Level 1
thinking. Figure 5 shows the number of Player 1s and Player 2s exhibiting the response pattern
predicted by the PSM along with the number of subjects who deviate from that pattern by one or
more response. For Player 1s, four subjects (10%) exhibit the pattern of choices predicted by the
PSM, another 10 (26%) exhibit patterns deviating from the predicted pattern by 1 response and
another 6 (15%) deviate from the predicted pattern by 2 responses. Among Player 2s, only one
(3%) exhibits a perfect pattern but an additional 13 (33%) deviate by only 1 response and 10
(26%) by two responses. Among the 51% of Player 1s and 62% of Player 2s exhibiting these
perfect or near perfect response patterns, only 9/(20x2) or 23% of Player 1s choices on M 5 and
SH 2 and 11/(24x2) 23% of Player 2s choices on BOS 5 and BOS 6 depart from best-response
predictions of the PSM. These percentages are quite different from the 50% predicted by L-1 for
these players in these games. It is only among choice patterns that differ by more than 2
responses from the patterns predicted by the PSM and for Level 1 players (i.e., that look more
random overall) that responses on M 5 and SH 2 for Player 1 and BOS 5 and BOS 6 for Player 2
begin to look random (22/38 or 58% and 14/30 or 47%, respectively.)
Figure 5
3.4

Predictive Performance Relative to Deductive Equilibrium Selection Criteria
As noted in the Introduction, attempts to address the coordination problem in asymmetric

games have focused on the potential role of deductive criteria like payoff dominance and risk
dominance. It is worth considering how these criteria compare with the PSM in terms of
explanatory power. For this purpose, consider Figure 6 in which games are organized by type
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(Battle of the Sexes (BOS), then Matching (M), then Stag-hunt (SH) games), with the predictions
of the PSM for Player 1 (2) listed for each game, along with the percentage of respondents
choosing the option predicted by PSM.
Figure 6
The PSM predicts the majority choice for both players in thirteen of the fourteen games.
In the fourteenth game (payoff matrix SH 3in Figure 4), the differences in payoffs for both
strategies of both players are equal and PSM predicts random choice. The payoffs to strategies U
and to L are $6 and $0 while payoffs to D and to R are $3 and $3. So exactly 50% of the 78
subjects (16 P1s and 23 P2s) choose the strategy yielding either $6 or $0 and 50% (23 P1s and
16 P2s) choose the strategy yielding $3 or $3.
In Figure 6, entries below the “% Choosing” lines show the predicted strategy choices for
Player 1 and Player 2 assuming they use either a payoff dominance (PD), risk dominance (RD),
or the Level 1 criterion. Payoff dominance only makes predictions regarding the outcomes of the
Stag-hunt games SH 1 and SH 2, and only correctly predicts the majority choices in game SH 1.
Risk dominance fairs better, correctly predicting the majority choices for Players 1 and 2 in BOS
5 and 6, M 1 through M 3 and in SH 1 and SH 2. It makes no predictions in the other games and,
to the extent it is an equilibrium selection criterion, it cannot explain why majority choices in the
games in Figure 3 all correspond to disequibria outcomes. The Level 1 model makes unique
predictions in nine of the fourteen games and correctly predicts the majority choice in these nine
games. In contrast, PSM makes unique predictions for thirteen of the fourteen games and
accurately predicts both players’ majority choices and hence, equilibrium selection and out-ofequilibrium play, for all of the thirteen games.
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Conclusion
There is little doubt that notions of salience and focal points are important to

understanding behavior in games. However, as Gold and Sugden (2006) point out, they have not
been integrated into the formal structure of game theory. Here, we have attempted to address
this situation. In particular, we provided an axiomatic approach to characterizing focal points and
to predicting equilibrium selection and out-of-equilibrium play in 2x2 games. The model applies
to both coordination games (with multiple equilibria) and non-coordination games (with a unique
equilibrium). We have shown that in the context of asymmetric games, the assumptions that
players perceive certain payoffs as salient, and that the salient payoffs are those associated with
larger payoff differences, lead naturally to definitions of salient strategies and a salience
coincident outcome. If the salience coincident outcome is a Nash equilibrium, then the outcome
is focal and players coordinate on that equilibrium. This result obtains even if players do not
communicate, payoffs are not symmetric and the outcomes have no special labels. If the salience
coincident outcome is not Nash, the game can result in coordination failure. Experimental
results for games in Figures 2 and 3 confirm these predictions regarding equilibrium selection
and out-of-equilibrium play.
In our analysis, we have shown an equivalence between two forms of bounded rationality
– players driven by salient payoffs, and those employing Level-1 reasoning both take the same
actions in 2x2 games in which a player’s own payoffs are at least as salient as the payoffs of the
opponent. In contrast, players driven by salient payoffs and those playing rationally in the sense
of classical game theory both take the same actions in 2x2 games in which a player’s own
payoffs are less salient than the payoffs of the opponent.
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The payoff salience model also provides a natural way to address the question of when a
player thinks strategically. This question is not addressed in traditional game theory (where
players are always assumed to be strategic), nor in Level-k models (where players have a fixed
level of strategic sophistication). In contrast, the strategy proposed for salience-based players
predicts myopic play when one’s own payoffs are perceived as salient but predicts strategic
thinking (in the sense of anticipating and best-responding to an opponent) if it is the opponent’s
payoffs that are salient. This sensitivity to theoretically irrelevant variations in payoff differences
is echoed in models of salience and similarity-based choice under risk and time. The individual
who plays myopically when her own-payoff differences are salient but strategically when it is the
opponent’s payoff differences that stand out might, by related reasoning, exhibit risk-seeking
behavior when the upside of a lottery is salient but risk aversion when its downside is salient or
exhibit patient behavior when payoff differences are salient and impatient behavior when the
time dimension is salient (Bordalo et al., 2012; Fisher & Rangel, 2014). In other words, the same
bounds on rationality that determine whether play in games appears myopic or strategic may also
determine whether choices are risk seeking versus risk-averse or patient versus impatient.
Finally, the PSM establishes a logical connection between salience-based play in the
symmetric games considered by Schelling and in games with asymmetric payoffs. For Schelling
games (where payoffs in each cell are the same for both players and payoff differences are equal)
agents do not care which strategy they play, as long as it matches the one played by their
counterpart. Such games are not payoff salient so coordination can only be determined by the
perceived salience of strategy labels. For games involving payoff asymmetries without salient
labels, coordination can only be determined by the perceived salience of the payoffs in the game.
Here, the PSM is consistent with the observation in Crawford et al. (2008) that games with even
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small payoff asymmetries (which make the games payoff salient) are no longer solved based on
salient labels. However, in either type of game, if the salience coincident outcome is a Nash
equilibrium, then the coordination problem is solved – by a commonly shared intuition about
salient labels in Schelling games or by commonly perceived salient payoffs in asymmetric
games. Thus, the model of payoff-based focal points presented here for games with asymmetric
payoffs is a natural analog to the label-based focal points in games with symmetric payoffs. In
addition, the two properties of a focal point in Definition 7 (that it is salience coincident and a
mutual best response) apply in both types of games.
Appendix: A Model of Focal Points with Endogenous Salient Payoffs
In our model, we assume players will perceive the larger of their payoffs, associated with
the larger difference in their payoffs (holding the opponent’s strategy fixed), as their own salient
payoff. Each player’s salient strategy is the strategy that might yield that player’s own salient
payoff. When each player has a salient strategy, we have a payoff salient game. Players choose
their salient strategy to the extent they perceive it as more salient than their opponent’s salient
strategy and they best respond to their opponent’s salient strategy otherwise. More formally,
consider the following definitions regarding Player 1 (the corresponding notation and definitions
apply analogously for Player 2) engaged in a general 2x2 game of the form in Table 1 in which
denotes the payoff to Player 1 when he plays strategy
Definition 1 (Own Salient Payoffs): Player 1 perceives

hold:
(ordinal salience)

.

, as salient if it is the largest

payoff associated with the largest payoff difference. That is,

(i)

and Player 2 plays

.

is salient if (i) and (ii)
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.

(cardinal salience)

Condition (i) in Definition 1 is consistent with a perceptual system that naturally searches for the
largest payoffs in the game the player can receive. Condition (ii) in Definition 1 is consistent
with the intuition that larger differences in payoffs are more salient than smaller differences.
Definition 2 (Payoff-Salient Game): A game is payoff salient if there exists a salient payoff for
each player.
Definition 2 applies to numerical instantiations of all 2x2 strict ordinal games.
Definition 3 (Salient Strategy): Strategy

is salient for Player 1 if it contains her salient

payoff.
Definition 1 makes predictions about which of a player’s payoffs will be salient to her in
a given 2x2 game. We next define a measure of the degree of salience of a player’s own payoffs,
as the largest absolute difference in her payoffs, holding the other player’s strategy fixed:
Definition 4 (Degree of Own-payoff salience): For Player 1, the degree of own-payoff salience
is given by:
Similarly, we measure the salience of Player 2’s payoffs, as perceived by Player 1, as the
largest absolute difference in Player 2’s payoffs, holding Player 1’s strategy fixed.
Definition 5 (Degree of Other-payoff salience): For Player 1, the degree of other-payoff
salience is given by:

.

A Theory of Focal Points

32

Own-payoff and other-payoff salience are defined analogously for Player 2. For
simplicity, in our analysis, we have implicitly set

for

.

We thus assume that players have a shared perceptual apparatus for identifying salient payoffs.
To capture the behavior of Player 1, if influenced by salient payoffs, consider strategy
Strategy

: Choose the salient strategy for Player 1 if

.

Best respond to Player 2’s salient strategy if
Strategy

:

.

dictates that when Player 1’s own salient strategy is at least as salient to him as

Player 2’s salient strategy, he chooses his own salient strategy. However, if Player 2’s salient
strategy is more salient to Player 1 than Player 1’s own salient strategy, Player 1 is prompted to
think strategically, in which case he best responds to Player 2.
In principle, there may be a parameter,

, which reflects the decision maker’s

sensitivity to own versus other’s payoff salience (e.g., Player 1 chooses his salient strategy if
and otherwise best-responds). In our analysis, we implicitly set
Under strategy

a player becomes increasingly myopic as

increasingly strategic as

.

goes to zero and becomes

grows large. Thus, accounting for the parameter

may make the

model econometrically testable when applied to predict empirical frequencies with which
strategies are played. In this sense,

may be thought of as a continuous analog to levels of

strategic sophistication in a cognitive hierarchy model of boundedly rational behavior.
To the extent both players employ Strategy

with the corresponding notation and

definitions applied analogously for Player 2, there will always be a salience coincident outcome
defined by the salient strategies selected by the two players. If neither player has any incentive to
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deviate from the strategy profile that produced this outcome (i.e., to the extent the outcome is a
mutual best response), this outcome is a focal point. However, if the salience coincident outcome
is not a mutual best response, salience based reasoning leads to a coordination failure.
Definition 6 (Salience Coincident Outcome): A strategy profile
if

is salient for Player 1 and

,

is salience coincident

is salient for Player 2.

Based on Definition 6, we now formally define a focal point for payoff-salient games:
Definition 7 (Focal Point): A focal point is an outcome that is both salience coincident and a
mutual best-response.
Applying the preceding definitions, we offer the following results:
Proposition 1: Every 2x2 payoff-salient game has a unique salience coincident outcome.
Proof: In a payoff salient game, each player has a unique salient strategy since the absolute
difference in payoff differences must be strictly positive for the game to be payoff-salient. Thus,
the strategy profile containing the salient strategies for each player is unique.
Proposition 2 (Nash equilibrium with salience-based players): For any 2x2 game, if a Nash
equilibrium is a focal point, then the outcome for salience-based players will be that equilibrium.
Proof: Without loss of generality, refer to the generic 2x2 game in Table 1 and suppose that
is both a Nash equilibrium and is salience coincident. Then
. First, consider the case where
based Player 1 plays salient strategy

Then a salience-

, and a salience-based Player 2 best responds to Player

1’s salient strategy. Thus Player 2 plays
based Player 2 plays salient strategy

and

. Analogously, if

, and Player 1 best responds by playing

, Players 1 and 2 play their own salient strategies.

, a salienceFinally, if
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Proposition 3 (Coordination for salience-based players): Consider any 2x2 payoff-salient
game with multiple pure strategy equilibria. If

, salience-based players will

always select a unique equilibrium (i.e., there will be no coordination failure).
Proof: For 2x2 games, pure-strategy Nash equilibria occur along a diagonal of the matrix.
Without loss of generality, refer to the generic 2x2 game in Table 1 and suppose that
are both Nash equilibria. Proposition 2 implies that if either

or

and
is

salience coincident, the outcome of the game played by salience-based players will be an
equilibrium. Next, suppose that
Player 1 plays

is salience coincident. If

and Player 2 best responds to

then Player 2 plays

, and thus plays

and Player 1 best responds by playing

find that a Nash equilibrium is played if

then
. If

,

. Proceeding analogously, we

is salience coincident, provided that

.
Proposition 4: Consider any 2x2 payoff-salient game. If

, then:

(iii)

The outcome for salience-based players is salience coincident

(iv)

Salience-based players select an equilibrium if and only if that equilibrium is a focal
point.

Proof: We return to the generic 2x2 game in Table I. Suppose
Since

Player 1 plays

and Player 2 plays

is salience coincident.
. Proceeding analogously for

each of the other cells in Table 1, we find that the (unique) salience coincident outcome will be
played. Part (ii) of Proposition 4 is implied by (i).
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Figure 1
Game Outcomes as a Result of Salience-Based Reasoning

I

L
R
U 11.00 10.00 4.00 3.10
D 4.10 3.00 4.10 3.10

II

L
R
U 11.00 11.00 4.00 10.00
D 4.10 3.10 4.10 10.00
IV

L
R
U 11.00 11.00 3.00 7.00
D 7.00 3.00 7.00 7.00

III

L
R
U 11.00 7.00 4.00 6.00
D 4.10 3.00 4.10 6.00
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Table 1. A generic 2x2 game
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Figure 2
Testing Sufficient Conditions for Equilibrium Play – Between Subject Results

BOS 1

M1

L
R
10.00 9.00 1.00 1.00 35
U
*
90%
2.00 9.00 2.00 10.00 4
D
*
10%
38 97% 1
3%

L
R
11.00 11.00 3.00 3.50 8
U
*
21%
3.50 3.00 11.00 11.00 31
D
*
79%
13 33% 26 67%
SH 1

L
R
6.00 6.00 0.00 1.00 36
U
*
92%
1.00 0.00 1.00 1.00
3
D
*
8%
37 95% 2 5%
M2
L
R
11.00 11.00 3.00 3.50 6
U
*
15%
10.50 3.00 11.00 11.00 33
D
*
85%
11 28% 28 72%

M3
L
R
11.00 11.00 3.00 10.50 6
U
*
15%
10.50 3.00 11.00 11.00 33
D
*
85%
6 15% 33 85%

BOS denotes Battle-of-the-Sexes Game; M denotes Matching Game; SH denotes Stag-Hunt Game;
Salience Coincident outcomes are in bold font; Nash Equilibria are indicated by (*).
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Figure 3
Testing Necessary Conditions for Equilibrium Play – Between Subject Results

BOS 2
L
R
10.00 2.00 1.00 1.00
U
*
2.00 2.00 2.00 10.00
D
*
8 21% 31 79%

BOS 3
25
64%
14
36%

BOS 4
L
R
10.00 9.00 1.00 1.00
U
*
1.00 1.00 9.00 10.00
D
*
16 41% 23 59%

L
R
10.00 9.00 1.00 1.00 4
U
*
10%
9.00 9.00 9.00 10.00 35
D
*
90%
35 90% 4 10%

M4
25
64%
14
36%

L
R
11.00 11.00 10.50 10.50 37
U
*
95%
3.00 3.00 11.00 11.00 2
D
*
5%
1
3% 38 97%

BOS denotes Battle-of-the-Sexes Game; M denotes Matching Game;
Salience Coincident outcomes are in bold font; Nash Equilibria are indicated by (*).

41

A Theory of Focal Points
Figure 4
Level-1 versus Salience-Based Play
Random Choice vs. Best Response – Between Subject Results

M5

SH 2

L
R
11.00 11.00 5.00 10.50 16
U
*
41%
5.00 3.00 11.00 11.00 23
D
*
59%
5 13% 34 87% 39

U
D

L
R
6.00 6.00 0.00 5.90

15
*
38%
3.00 0.00 3.00 5.90 24
*
62%
10 26% 29 74% 39

SH 3
U
D

L
R
6.00 6.00 0.00 3.00

16
*
41%
3.00 0.00 3.00 3.00 23
*
59%
23 59% 16 41% 39

BOS 5

BOS 6

L
R
10.00 5.50 1.00 1.00

L
R
10.00 5.50 1.00 1.00

33
*
85%
2.00 5.50 2.00 10.00 6
D
*
15%
30 77% 9 23% 39
U

U
D

2
*
5%
9.00 5.50 9.00 10.00 37
*
95%
16 41% 23 59% 39

BOS denotes Battle-of-the-Sexes Game; M denotes Matching Game; SH denotes Stag-Hunt Game;
Nash Equilibria are indicated by (*).
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Figure 5
Comparison of Individual Response Patterns to PSM Predictions

Deviations From
Predicted Choice
Pattern

Number of
Player 1s
Exhibiting
Pattern

0
1 Off
2 Off
3 Off
4 Off
5 Off
6 Off
9 Off

4
10
6
8
6
3
1
1

Deviations From
Predicted Choice
Pattern
Perfect Pattern
1 Off

Number of
Player 2s
Exhibiting
Pattern
1
13

2 Off
3 Off
4 Off
5 Off
6 Off
7 Off

10
4
4
2
4
1

Player 1
Errors on M 5

Errors on SH 2

Total Errors
on M5 and
SH2

0
4
3
2
3
2
1
1

0
0
2
6
4
1
1
1

0
4
5
8
7
3
2
2

Player 2
Errors on BOS 5

Errors on BOS 6

Total Errors
on BOS 5 and
BOS 6

0
0

0
4

0
4

4
0
2
1
2
0

3
3
2
1
2
1

7
3
4
2
4
1
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Figure 6
Predictive Performance of the PSM Compared to Traditional Equilibrium Selection
Criteria
BOS 1 BOS 2 BOS 3 BOS 4 BOS 5 BOS 6

PSM predicts

Player 1
D

M1

M2

M3

M4

M5

SH 1

SH 2

SH 3

D

D

D

U

D

U

D

---

U

U

D

U

U

90%

64%

90%

64%

85%

95%

79%

85%

85%

95%

59%

92%

62%

41%

PD predicts

---

x

x

x

---

---

---

---

---

x

---

U

U

---

RD predicts

U

x

x

x

U

D

D

D

D

x

D

U

D

---

Level 1 predicts

U

U

D

U

U

D

D

D

D

U

---

U

---

---

PSM predicts

L

L

R

L

L

R

R

R

L

R

L

R

---

97%

79%

90%

59%

77%

67%

72%

85%

97%

87%

95%

74%

% Choosing

% Choosing

Player 2
R
59%

59%

PD predicts

---

x

x

x

---

---

---

---

x

x

---

L

L

---

RD predicts

L

x

x

x

L

R

R

R

R

x

R

L

R

---

L

L

R

L

---

---

R

R

R

L

R

L

R

---

Level 1 predicts

“x” denotes a non-unique and incorrect prediction. In particular, it denotes a game with ‘out-of-equilibrium’ play
which violates both Payoff Dominance (PD) and Risk Dominance (RD) that predict that players will coordinate on
an equilibrium; “---” denotes a non-unique prediction.
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Highlights for “A Theory of Focal Points in 2x2 Games”





A theory of focal points for asymmetric 2x2 games is proposed.
Salient payoff differences endogenously identify focal outcomes.
The model predicts equilibrium selection and out-of-equilibrium play
Experimental results confirming predictions of the model are discussed
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